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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the contingency effects of economic freedom on 
the growth effect of the exchange rate in a panel of 83 emerging markets 
and developing countries over the period 1976-2010. Based on the 
generalized method of moments system estimators (SGMM) that control 
for the weakness and proliferation of instruments, we uncover positive and 
significant contingency effects of economic freedom on the growth effect 
of the real exchange rate undervaluation. The marginal growth effects of 
the real exchange rate undervaluation are enhanced as countries improve 
the qualities of their economic institutions. The findings are robust with 
the exclusion of outliers and oil-exporting countries, alternative measures 
of real exchange rate undervaluation, additional control variables, sub-
components of economic freedom, and multicollinearity between the 
interaction term and the original variables. 
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INTRODUCTION
The role of macroeconomic policies in steering the development process has always been 
central to economic analysis. In this regard, exchange rate policy has been viewed as an 
important vehicle in the global economy and thereby for international transactions. The 
exchange rate which is defined as a relative price of non-tradable goods to tradable goods 
acts as a key indicator of the international competitiveness of a country vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world. Thus, exchange rate movements are an important factor that influences trade and 
financial flows across countries and hence the balance of payments. It is therefore likely that 
a sound exchange rate policy is a crucial condition in influencing not only the stability of the 
international market but more essentially the domestic economy at large. Along these lines, 
however, there is a significant debate among scholars and policymakers about the impact of 
the exchange rate on economic growth. Bhalla (2008) stressed that instead of focusing on 
exchange rate regimes one should rather emphasise on the direction of the exchange rate (i.e. 
undervaluation or overvaluation) for the better achievement of a country’s economic growth 
and macroeconomic balance. Along these lines, Naseem and Hamizah (2013) highlighted that 
the presence of a protracted real exchange rate (RER) overvaluation is well-established, which 
leads to a non-optimum allocation of resources, inconsistency of macroeconomic policies, 
rent-seeking and corruption, lower economic growth, an unsustainable current account deficit 
as well as currency crashes.
Although a consensus seems to emerge on the detrimental effects of a RER overvaluation, 
the parallel theoretical and analytical issues concerning a RER undervaluation remain 
unresolved at both the theoretical and empirical levels. On one hand, some scholars argue that 
exchange rate undervaluation i.e. at a highly competitive, below-market value is believed to 
provide a favourable atmosphere to spur economic growth (Rodrik 2008). On the other hand, 
others are sceptical that the relative prices between currencies would act as a fundamental 
driver for long-run economic growth. This is because nominal exchange rates, like any other 
nominal variables, seem to be immaterial to growth while the real exchange rate appears 
to be an endogenous variable that is out of the control of policymakers. This poses several 
questions and challenges among researchers trying to determine the effects of real exchange 
rate undervaluation on growth. This is also coupled with the inconclusive evidence that has 
been accumulated. For instance, previous studies that contributed to this unsettled debate found 
conflicting results, for example, Bresser-Pereira (2002), Polterovich and Popov (2004), Dooley 
et al., (2005), Hausmann et al. (2005), Rodrik (2008), Eichengreen (2008) and Macdonal and 
Vieira (2010) showed that exchange rate undervaluation increases economic growth, while 
Kahn (1994), Johnson et al.  (2006), and Haddad and Pancaro (2010) discovered adverse 
effects of RER undervaluation on economic growth. Furthermore, Razin and Collins (1997) 
and Aguirre and Calderon (2005) emphasised that a large undervaluation hurt growth, while 
a modest undervaluation enhanced growth. Added to these opposing findings, there are also 
studies that failed to establish a significant relationship between RER undervaluation and 
economic growth (Nouira and Sekkat, 2012).
A recent related line of research argued that a RER undervaluation policy can get around 
structural deficiencies in promoting economic growth. For instance, Rodrik (2008) argued 
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that an undervalued RER would lead to stronger growth particularly for developing countries 
because their tradable sectors usually suffer more disproportionately from institutional 
weakness and market failures. Therefore, sustained currency real depreciation raises the relative 
profitability of investing in tradable sectors and hence acts as a second-best fashion to alleviate 
the economic costs of these distortions (i.e. weak institutions). This conjecture was further 
supported by Steinberg (2011) who found that financial development as a channel through 
which undervaluation constructively affects growth by lessening the symptoms of frictions, 
specifically in financially under-developed countries. These studies implied that government 
policies that intentionally undervalue the RER to promote growth may get around the weak 
institutional environment and low level of financial development (second best view). 
Other studies have also shown the different channels that the RER provides towards 
growth. For instance, Di Nino et al. (2011) showed that there was a positive relationship 
between undervaluation and economic growth by increasing exports, especially from high-
productivity sectors, in Italy between 1861-2011. Aizenman and Lee (2010), McLeod and 
Mileva (2011) and Benigno et al. (2015) argued that RER undervaluation acts like a subsidy 
to the (more efficient) tradable sector, where a weak exchange rate supports production in the 
tradable sector.1 From a different viewpoint, Gluzmann et al. (2012) found that there was an 
insignificant response to undervaluation from export and import flows. Instead, Gluzmann et 
al. (2012) found that savings, investment and employment are more important than the tradable 
sector for the undervaluation-growth effect. Specifically, their study demonstrated that a weak 
exchange rate led to higher saving and investment through lower labour costs and income 
re-distribution. Through shifting resources, real devaluation would further boost savings and 
investment in financially-constrained firms relative to financially developed ones. 
However, most recent studies that have looked at the various intervening/facilitating factors 
on the growth effect of exchange rate undervaluation have largely ignored the fundamental role 
of the institutional setting in influencing policy outcomes and growth despite strong theoretical 
and empirical consensus on the importance of institutions in the growth process (North, 1990; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2003, 2005, Rodrik et al., 2004; Justesen, 2008).2 Acemoglu et al. (2003) 
argued that the emergence and persistence of bad macroeconomic policy outcomes were due to a 
weak institutional setting. Thus, the effects of policy on growth may depend on the institutional 
setting. Similarly, Easterly and Levine (2003) found that macroeconomic policies (inflation, 
trade, and real exchange rate overvaluation) lost power in explaining economic growth once 
institutional variables were controlled for. These led Easterly (2005) and Acemoglu et al. 
(2003) to speculate that adverse macroeconomic policy may be the proxy for weak institutions. 
More recently, Fatas and Mihov (2013) also showed that strong institutions explained better 
fiscal policy outcomes and that institutions enhanced (lowered) the growth effect of policy 
1Undervaluation of exchange rate is believed to enhance a country’s international competitiveness level that encourages 
exports and investment, and thereby allows the reaping of more benefits from cheaper local currency and hence economic 
growth (Ahmad et al., 2010; Naseem et al., 2010).
2 Literature focusing on the role of economic freedom (EF) also shows that EF and some of its components promote growth 
as summarised in a meta-analysis by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006). Though some criticism remains as to the two-
way or feedback relationship between institutions or governance and growth (Jomo and Chowdhury, 2012), other scholars 
for example Justesen (2008) shows that composite EF and its components especially government size (fiscal institutions) 
and regulatory institutions cause growth while Compton et al. (2014) showed that the effects differ across income quartiles 
in the case of the U.S. In this study we contribute to the debate focusing not on the direct effect of institutions (EF) on 
growth but instead the complementary role it plays on the growth effect of policy (EF) within the dynamic panel data 
framework that controls for endogeneity of the right-hand side variables.
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outcome (fiscal policy volatility). Thus, the role of institutions embedded in the country may 
influence not only policy outcomes but also the growth effect of policy outcomes. Slesman 
(2014), for instance, showed that better quality market-supporting institutions lowered the 
growth effects of inflation and inflation volatility in developing countries while Emara (2012) 
also showed that better quality regulatory institutions lowered the growth effect of inflation 
volatility. However, there seems to be a lack of direct empirical evidence on the interaction 
effects between institutions along economic freedom and real exchange rate undervaluation on 
economic growth within the context of emerging markets and developing countries.   
In this study, we provide new empirical evidence on the facilitating/mediating role plays 
by the institutional setting in the relationship between RER undervaluation and growth in 
developing countries. Specifically, we investigate the complementary roles play by economic 
freedom (i.e. economic institutions) on the marginal growth effects of RER undervaluation 
in developing countries. Given the above-mentioned view that institutional arrangements 
determine the policy outcome and policy volatilities, our main contribution in this paper is 
our attempt to shed additional light on the importance of the institutional channel through 
which undervaluation affects the growth process. Particularly, we contribute to the literature 
by emphasising the important role that economic freedom (i.e. economic institutions) may play 
in mediating the marginal effects of relative price changes on economic development, focusing 
specifically on a relatively more homogenous panel of developing countries which possess 
relatively more variation in their institutional qualities. Another contribution, discussed in 
further detail below, is that we have addressed this issue more carefully within the dynamic panel 
data framework of system GMM, controlling for weakness and proliferation of instruments. 
This is important in the context of institution-policy complementarities and growth because 
weakness and proliferation of instruments problems may result in a type I error and fragility 
of the results, i.e. showing significant growth effects of the interaction between the RER and 
economic freedom which is in fact not correlated (see Slesman et al., 2015; Vieira et al., 2012). 
We estimated the RER undervaluation using the framework proposed by Rodrik (2008) 
that adjusted for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Based on a panel dynamic growth model for 
83 emerging markets and developing countries during the period 1976-2010 that controlled 
for the endogeneity of all regressors, weakness and proliferation of instruments, the results 
reveal that the marginal growth effects of RER undervaluation are enhanced as the level of 
economic freedom is improved. The results further reveal that the most important dimensions 
of economic freedom are indicators that reflect government size (fiscal institutions), freedom 
to trade internationally, and regulatory institutions. In addition, these findings are robust with 
the exclusion of outliers, oil-exporting countries, additional control of policy variables and 
democracy. The clear policy implication is that improvements in economic freedom can yield 
growth benefits from a macroeconomic policy of RER undervaluation. Furthermore, our 
findings suggest that policymakers should be pragmatic in institutional reform by targeting 
the most binding institutional constraints along fiscal and regulatory institutions and advocate 
institutional arrangements that promote free trade.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the model 
specification and method used in the analysis. Section 3 reports and discusses the empirical 
results and finally, the last section concludes with the key findings and policy implications of 
the study.
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EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION, METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Empirical Specification
We assess the interaction effect of economic institutions and the exchange rate on economic 
growth based on earlier works (Islam, 1998; Rodrik, 2008) using the following dynamic growth 
model specification.
yit - yi,t-1 = αyi,t-1 + β1UNDERVALit + β2EFit + β3(UNDERVALit x EFit ) + θ’Xit + ηi + μit
or 
yit = βyi,t-1 + β1UNDERVALit + β2EFit + β3(UNDERVALit x EFit) + θ’Xit + ηi + μit Eq. (1)
Subscript i and t indicate, respectively, the country and time index; y is the logarithmic 
value of real GDP per capita; UNDERVAL is the Balassa-Samuelson adjusted real exchange 
undervaluation3; EF is economic freedom that captures the quality of economic institutions; X 
is a vector of other control variables; ηi is a time-invariant unobserved country-specific effect 
term; and μit is the usual error term. Eq. (1) predicts the coefficient on  yi,t-1 to be positive for 
conditional convergence, and negative for divergence (Islam, 1995; Slesman et al., 2015). 
We expect a positive sign to indicate that laggard countries grow faster and catch up with rich 
countries. One major weakness in the empirical literature is that it does not provide a clear 
guidance on the set of control variables to be included in the growth equation. This is due 
to the fact that there exist as many potential growth determinants as the number of countries 
under analysis (Durlauf et al., 2005). To avoid this problem, we follow recent studies (Levine 
and Renelt, 1992; Islam, 1995; Azman-Saini et al., 2010; Slesman et al., 2015) to opt for the 
Solow growth theoretical driven vector of control variables, X, which encompass the log of 
initial income, population growth, the investment ratio, and Barro and Lee’s (2013) secondary 
schooling to proxy for human capital. Nevertheless, we also control for a set of additional 
policy and institutional variables reflecting the size of the government, trade openness, inflation 
and political institutions. 
Before we discuss the contingency effect of economic institutions on the growth effects 
of exchange rate undervaluation, we should make clear how the measure of UNDERVAL is 
computed. We follow Rodrik (2008) in computing the time-varying index of UNDERVAL that 
adjusts for the Balassa-Samuelson effect.4 The procedure is as follows. First, the real exchange 
rate is computed as ln RERit = ln(XRATit/PPPit)  where XRAT and PPP are exchange rates and 
purchasing power parity conversion factors, respectively, and are each expressed in terms of 
national currency units per U.S. dollar. Both XRAT and PPP are from the Penn World Table 
version 7.1. RER can take values of more than one to indicate that the value of the currency 
is lower (more depreciated) than indicated by PPP. Rodrik (2008) argued that through the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect nontradable goods are cheaper than tradable goods in poor countries, 
therefore, an adjustment should be made. The second step, then, is to isolate the income and 
3 Detail on its construction is provided below. As an alternative measure, we also used real exchange rate that is unadjusted 
for the Balassa-Samuelson effects. The results are reported in Table 3A.
4 UNDERVAL is adjusted for relative price of tradables to nontradables, i.e.  the Balassa-Samuelson effect, in the sense that 
as countries get richer, the relative prices of non-tradable goods and services tend to rise because of higher productivity in 
the tradables (see Rodrik, 2008). 
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intrinsic time specific effects from the portion reflecting RER through regressing , lnRERit = 
α + λln RGDPCit + μi + νt , where ln RGDPCit  is the log of the non-overlapping five-year 
average of real income per capita, μt is a time fixed effect. The result (not reported) shows the 
coefficient λ to be -0.044 and is significant at 5% (t statistic = 2). This is much smaller than 
the coefficient of -0.24 found by Rodrik (2008) in a mixed sample of developed and developing 
countries. This suggests that the extent of the Balassa-Samuelson effect is small among the 
developing countries sample: when income increases by 10 percent, the real exchange rate 
would fall by about 0.44 percent. Lastly, lnUNDERVAL is computed as the difference between 
the actual lnRERit and the predicted  lnRERit , i.e. lnUNDERVALit = lnRERit - lnRERit. We take 
anti-log of lnUNDERVAL to convert it into a level form, UNDERVAL, which has a base of one. 
As pointed out by Rodrik (2008) when UNDERVAL exceeds one it means that the exchange 
rate is undervalued: goods produced at home are relatively cheaper in dollar terms. Similarly, 
when UNDERVAL is less than one, the exchange rate is overvalued. 
We now turn to our main interest on how economic institutions mediate the marginal effects 
of exchange rate undervaluation on growth. We evaluate the marginal and statistically significant 
effects of UNDERVAL on growth at various levels of quality of economic institutions, using 
an interaction model and the associated computed standard errors proposed by Brambor et al. 
(2006).5 The marginal effect of UNDERVAL can be calculated by taking a partial derivative 
of Eq. (1) as follows:
Furthermore, naturally, there would be a high correlation between the interaction term 
UNDERVALit x EFit and its components used to construct it, i.e. UNDERVALit and EFit. 
Burrill (2007) and Azman-Saini et al. (2010) suggested that we mitigate this problem of 
multicollinearity between the original variables and the interaction term by orthogonalizing the 
interaction terms in the following manner: UNDERVALit x EFit is regressed on UNDERVALit 
and EFit to generate residuals. These residual terms would be used as the representation of the 
interaction term. Finally, using the procedure provided by Brambor et al. (2006) we evaluate 
the statistical significance of the marginal effects of UNDERVAL on growth at three levels of 
economic freedom (EF) namely the minimum, mean and maximum scores on EF and its five 
sub-components. 
METHODOLOGY
In order to estimate Eq. (1), we employ the generalized method-of-moments (GMM) panel 
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995, Blundell and Bond, 1998) to 
provide consistent estimates of the interaction effects of economic institutions and real exchange 
5 Based on interaction model: Y=β0+β1 X+β2 Z+β3 XZ, the marginal effects of X on Y is computed as  
  
with the standard error calculated using covariance matrix with the formula:  
 
Computation is conducted using Stata code provided by Brambor et al. (2006). 
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rate undervaluation on output growth.6 This estimator has a number of advantages over cross-
sectional techniques and traditional panel estimators, especially its abilities to control for 
the endogeneity of all explanatory variables, account for unobserved country-specific effects 
and allowing the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as regressors. Endogeneities of 
UNDERVAL and EF are a major concern when estimating their effects on growth (see Acemoglu 
et al., 2001; and Habib et al., 2017; respectively). First, Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed 
a differenced-GMM (DGMM) estimator in which we eliminate country-specific effects by 
transforming Equation (1) into a first-difference form, and dealing with the endogeneity problem 
of the right-hand side variables including the lag-dependent variable through instrumenting 
the first differenced-series of the right-hand side variables using their lagged levels (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). Although DGMM can mitigate problems due to country-specific effects 
and simultaneity bias, one major limitation remains. Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that 
the lagged levels of the regressors convey little information about their future changes when 
the regressors are persistent, e.g. economic institutions, i.e. EF, making lagged levels to be a 
weak instrument for their differenced-series and this may lead to biased parameter estimates 
in small samples and larger variance asymptotically. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995) proposed that we simultaneously 
estimate Eq. (1) as a system of regressions in difference and levels forms: estimating regression 
in difference using lagged levels of the regressors as instruments and regression in levels 
using lagged values of their differenced series as instruments. This strategy is known as 
system-GMM estimation (SGMM) and is shown to be able to overcome the weak instrument 
problems associated with the DGMM estimator. In this paper, we tackle the weak instrument 
problem by employing SGMM. To evaluate the validity of SGMM, three specification tests are 
employed. The first test examines the hypothesis that the error terms in the difference-equation 
(i.e. Δμit) are not second-order serially correlated. The second test is the Hansen’s (1982) J 
test for overidentification restrictions used to test the null that instruments are not correlated 
with the error terms. Finally, we apply the difference-in-Hansen test to examine the validity 
of additional instruments used in the regression in levels, i.e. the lagged values of differenced 
series.  Failure to reject the null for these tests indicates that the model is adequately specified. 
Furthermore, we follow Roodman’s (2009) strategy by reducing the dimensionality of the 
instrumental variables (through collapsing the instrument) matrix to mitigate the instrument 
proliferation problems that can weaken above specification tests as well as increase the tendency 
to commit type I errors (see Roodman, 2009). This happens when the instrument ratio r = i⁄N 
is larger than one (i.e. the number of instruments, i, is larger than the number of countries N). 
We ensure that r would always be less than one.7 Therefore, unlike previous studies including 
Rodrik (2008), one additional contribution that our study makes to the growth literature is to 
account for weak instruments and the proliferation of instruments and their consequences for 
the contingency effects of economic institutions on the effect of exchange rate undervaluation 
on economic growth in developing countries.
6 See Azman-Saini et al. (2010) for detailed discussion on this estimator in the context of the growth equation while 
Slesman et al. (2015) add on the importance of dealing with the proliferation of instruments problem.
7  Vieira et al. (2012) showed recently that in the context of panel data, correction for the proliferation of instruments in 
SGMM makes the institutions-growth nexus become fragile statistically. Thus, it is important to correct for this problem 
to ensure that our results are robust.
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DATA 
We estimate Eq. (1) using the SGMM estimator on a panel of 83 developing and emerging 
economies over the period 1976–2010. The list of the countries included in this study is available 
upon request. The sample period is divided into seven non-overlapping five-year periods 
(1976–1980, 1981–1985 …, 2006–2010), T=7. Although we are dealing with an unbalanced 
panel due to missing data for some countries, we ensure that those few countries must have at 
least at the minimum T = 4 to meet the SGMM requirement. Data for the variables used in the 
analysis were taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT, version 7.1) and the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The dependent variable is the log of per capita real (weighted 
chained series) GDP (LRGDPC), as reported in the PWT. We follow the literature (Islam, 1995; 
Azman-Saini et al., 2010; Slesman et al., 2015) to classify the regressors into stock and flow 
variables. Stock variables are measured at the beginning of each nonoverlapping five-year 
period, while flow variables are measured as the average over each five-year period. Stock 
variables consist of logged initial income (measured in 1975, 1980 ... , 2005, if the dependent 
variable is measured in 1980, 1985 ... , 2010), Barro and Lee’s (2013) average year of secondary 
schooling (as a proxy for human capital) (SCHOOL), and, our focal variables, the Fraser-
Institute’s measures of economic freedom and its five components namely government size 
(i.e., expenditures, taxes, and enterprises) (GOVSIZ); legal structure and security of property 
rights (LEGAL)8; access to sound money (SM); freedom to trade internationally (TRADE); and 
regulation of credit, labor, and business (REGCRED). Flow variables consist of real investment 
shares of real GDP (INV) (PWT), population growth (WDI), inflation (INF) measured as the 
annual change in the consumer price index (CPI) (WDI), government size measured as the 
share of government consumption relative to GDP (GOV) (PWT), degree of trade openness 
measured as exports plus imports over GDP (OPEN) (WDI), and Freedom House’s political 
rights index as a measure of political institutions in the form of democracy (DEMOC)9. Table 
1 provides a summary of the main variables used in this paper.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Table 2. The interaction effects of real exchange rate undervaluation and EF on growth
Coeff. S.e.
Constant 0.4141 (0.1354)a
Initial Income (log) 0.9003 (0.0207)a
Population growth –0.0446 (0.0149)a
Investment ratio 0.0030 (0.0015)c
Schooling 0.0916 (0.0215)a
Real exchange rate undervaluation (UNDERVAL) 0.1038 (0.0289)b
8 LEGAL captures the degree of general observance of rule of law, security of the private property rights, independent 
judiciary and impartial court. Rent-seeking would be expected to be prevalent if weak/low quality of LEGAL exists in the 
country.
9 The scale of this index is 1 to 7, in which 1 means “there are competitive parties or other political groupings, the 
opposition plays an important role and has actual power,” while 7 indicates that political rights are absent. This index is 
rescaled from 0 to 10 to indicate that a high score means better-quality democratic institution.
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Economic freedom (EF) 0.0683 (0.0167) a
UNDERVAL × EF 0.0856 (0.0300) a  
Marginal effects of UNDERVAL at minimum EF 0.3604 (0.1125) a
Marginal effects of UNDERVAL at mean EF 0.5817 (0.1893) a  
Marginal effects of UNDERVAL at max EF 0.8590 (0.2861) a 
Time dummies Yes
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.689
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.111
Difference-in-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.297
Number of Instruments 49
Country/Observation 83/572
Note: S.e. indicates heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. AR(2) test is on the null of no second-order residual 
serial correlation. Hansen J-test reports p-value for null hypothesis of instrument validity. Difference-in-Hansen 
test reports p-values for the null of validity of the additional moment restrictions necessary for system GMM. 
Following Roodman (2009b), the instrument columns are collapsed. a, b and c indicate significance level at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively.
Table 2 reports the main empirical results on the medium- to long-run contingent effects 
of EF on the growth effect of real exchange rate undervaluation for 83 emerging markets and 
developing countries over the period 1976-2010. Model specification tests on SGMM suggest 
that the model is well specified including for instrument proliferation: it passes the AR (2) test 
that error terms exhibit no second-order serial correlation; it fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
the Hansen J test that the instruments used are valid (p-value = 0.111) and that the null of validity 
of additional instruments (lagged difference-series) used to estimate level equations is also 
confirmed as suggested by the difference-in-Hansen test (p-value = 0.297), and the instrument 
ratio is less than 1. The coefficient assessments on all core control variables included in the 
growth equation suggest that they all carry the expected sign and highly significant confirming 
literature (Islam, 1995; Azman-Saini et al., 2010; Slesman et al., 2015). The positive signed 
and statistically significant coefficient on the logged initial income confirms the neoclassical 
growth theoretical prediction of conditional convergence with the speed of convergence (λ) 
of about 2.1% that is closer to 1.74% found by Azman-Saini et al. (2010) who also controlled 
for economic freedom but for a mixed sample of developed and developing countries.10 The 
magnitude and statistically significant effects of other core controlled variables are well in line 
with recent existing growth studies (e.g., Azman-Saini et al., 2010).
Turning to our focal variables on the interaction term between UNDERVAL and EF (i.e. 
UNDERVAL×EF). The results in Table 2 show that the estimated coefficients of UNDERVAL, 
EF and UNDERVAL×EF are all positive and significant at the 1% significance level. This 
confirms that UNDERVAL and EF jointly affect growth directly by themselves as well as 
indirectly through the interaction term, UNDERVAL×EF. First of all, this result suggests that 
both exchange rate undervaluation policy and economic freedom have a crucial direct positive 
effect on the economic growth process in developing countries.11 This confirms conventional 
10 Using Eq. (1), the speed of convergence (λ) is given by solving tλβα −==+ exp~1   where t is the time gap between current 
and lagged income (= 5 years).
11 The model without UNDERVAL×EF also reports positive and significant results at 1 % on coefficients for UNDERVAL 
and EF. The result is available upon request from the author.
Table 2 (Cont.)
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wisdom that better quality of economic institutions promotes long-run economic prosperity 
(Gwartney et al., 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Azman-Saini et al., 2010) 
and that an undervaluing exchange rate policy promotes growth by reducing the economic 
cost associated with market failures through its increasing the relative profitability of tradables 
(Rodrik, 2008; Gluzmann et al., 2012; Béreau et al., 2012; Habib et al., 2017). It may also 
promote growth through the increase in the competitiveness of exports which is crucial for 
many export-led growth developing countries in the sampling countries. Secondly, and our 
main focus, is the positive and statistical significance of UNDERVAL×EF which shows that 
the marginal growth effect of UNDERVAL is enhanced indirectly through the improvements 
in EF. Further examination on the positive coefficients evaluated at the minimum, mean and 
maximum levels of EF show that they are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Further detailed evaluation shows that the marginal growth effect of a one-standard-deviation 
increase in UNDERVAL is associated with an increase in the annual growth rate of about 
3.297% when the EF is at the minimum level and that the effects jump to 5.322% and then 
7.858% as the EF score increases from the mean level to the maximum level, respectively.12 
These effects are indeed large magnitude effects and should not be ignored by developing 
countries. This paper further lends formal support to Rodrik’s (2008, p. 393-396) view that a 
better institutional environment enhances the growth effect of exchange rate undervaluation 
since such an environment imposes relatively lower transaction costs on tradables (which 
relatively exhibit more complex production processes compare to nontradables) by lower 
contractual incompleteness, fewer hold-up problems, lower corruption, better protection of 
private property rights and stronger enforcement of contracts. Thus, institutional reforms to 
improve the quality of economic institutions are crucial to promote the effectiveness of exchange 
rate policy on the long-run economic growth in developing countries.
Robustness Checks
Although we have ensured that not only our main results but all the findings reported in this 
paper are robust to weakness and proliferation of instruments through the use of SGMM and 
collapsing the instrument matrix, we further conduct robustness checks on our main findings as 
follows. We use an alternative measure of real exchange rate undervaluation (without adjusting 
for the Balassa-Samuelson effect); remove outliers, which could blur our main findings, by 
using the so-called DFITS test (Belsley et al., 1980) to flag and remove countries that have 
a high combination of leverage and residuals13; and follow Mankiw et al., (1992) to remove 
oil-exporting countries where a large proportion of their GDP is from oil/natural resource 
extraction rather than productive economic activities; control for additional policy variables 
to see whether our main results held up; and finally, we take a closer look at the disaggregate 
effect of each of the five sub-components of EF namely GOVSIZ, LEGAL, SM, TRADE and 
REGCRED. 
12 Obtained by multiplying the marginal effects at the three level of EF reported in Table 2 by the 
standard deviation of UNDERVAL (=0.4574) and divided by 5, the time gap in our panel estimate. 
13  where rj is a studentised residual given by with s( j ) and s are the root 
mean square error(s) of the regression equation with jth observation removed, and h is the leverage statistic (Belsley et al., 
1980; Azman-Saini et al., 2010; Naseem et al., 2015). The test flags any observation as outliers when the DFITS statistic 
is greater than 2√(k/n), with k, the number of independent variables, and n is the number of countries.
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Table 3A. Robust analysis: Sub-sample analysis and alternative measure
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Alternative measure: real 
exchange rate (unadjusted for 
Balassa-Samuelson effect) 
Excluding 
Outliers
Excluding 
Oil-exporting 
Countries
Constant 1.1291 a  
(0.2014)
0.0461 a 
  (0.2724)
0.0910  
(0.1730)
Initial Income (log) 0.8032 a 
 (0.0214)
0.9524 a  
(0.0316)
0.9523 a  
 (0.0207)
Population growth –0.0459 a 
 (0.0139)
–0.0501 b  
(0.0159)
–0.0160  
   (0.0182)
Investment ratio  0.0060 a 
  (0.0013)
0.0020  
(0.0015)
0.0024  
(0.0015)
Schooling   0.1317 a 
 (0.0270)
0.0596 b  
(0.0258)
0.0813 a 
  (0.0205)
Real exchange rate undervaluation 
(UNDERVAL)
–0.1257  
(0.1015)
0.1536 a   
(0.0477)
0.0914 a 
  (0.0305)
Economic Freedom (EF) 0.0575 c  
(0.0299)
0.0605 a 
 (0.0165)
0.0440 a 
  (0.0156)
UNDERVAL × EF  0.0469 b  
(0.0216)
 0.1348 a 
 (0.0357)
0.1601 a 
 (0.0334)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.724 0.858 0.400
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.245 0.105 0.110
Difference-in-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.524 0.318 0.105
Number of Instruments 49 49 49
Country/Observation 83/572 80/553 78/539
Note: See Table 2. a , b and c indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 3B. Robust analysis: Additional controls
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Constant 0.2518 b –0.0367 a –0.0446 a 0.4287 a
(0.1161) (0.1162) (0.0924) (0.096)
Initial Income (log) 0.9242 a 0.9355 a 0.9348 a 0.9013a
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.0146)
Population growth –0.0429 a –0.0223 b –0.0171 b –0.0275a
(0.0127) (0.0097) (0.0077) (0.007)
Investment ratio 0.0028 c 0.0053 a 0.0049 a 0.0036 a
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0007)
Schooling 0.0758 a 0.0763 a 0.0848 a 0.0887 a
(0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0165) (0.0136)
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UNDERVAL 0.1026 a 0.1046 a 0.1031 a 0.0691 a
(0.0219) (0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0108)
EF 0.0674 a 0.0654 a 0.0716 a 0.0422a
(0.0152) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0092)
UNDERVAL × EF 0.1185 a 0.1081 a 0.1052 a 0.0762 a
(0.0216) (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.0153)
Inflation –0.0002 a –0.00011 a –0.00009 a –0.00008 a
(0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Government expenditure ratio (GOV) 0.0086 a 0.0079 a 0.0021
(0.0025) (0.002) (0.0017)
Trade openness (OPEN) –0.0003 –0.00006
(0.0004) (0.0002)
Democracy  0.0140 a
(0.003)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.322 0.285 0.287 0.824
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.238 0.403 0.469 0.261
Difference-in-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.172 0.217 0.412 0.917
Number of Instruments 55 61 67 73
Country/Observation 83/572 83/572 83/572 77/533
Note: See Table 2.  UNDERVAL: Real exchange rate undervaluation; EF: Economic Freedom. a, b and c indicate 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Firstly, Table 3A reports the results using the alternative measure of UNDERVAL, and 
with outliers and oil-exporting countries removed.14  All of the specifications appear to be 
well-specified. Clearly, the sign and significance of the coefficients on UNDERVAL, EF and 
their interaction terms remain intact when the alternative measure of UNDERVAL is used 
(Model 1), outlier countries are removed (Model 2) and oil-exporting countries are removed 
(Model 3). Thus, these results appear to replicate our main finding. Next, we further control for 
additional covariates. Table 3B reports the results. Again, all the models are well-specified and 
the sign and significance of the coefficients on the main variables remain intact (Model 4-7). 
When inflation is added (Model 4-7) it is negative and highly significant and highly robust 
supporting recent studies (e.g. Baharumshah et al., 2016) that found low and stable inflation 
to be a crucial ingredient supporting long-run economic growth. Other control variables such 
as government expenditure and trade openness are not robustly influencing growth while 
democracy promotes growth.
14 The DFIT test suggests El Salvador, United Arab Emirate (UAE), and Democratic Republic of Congo, as outliers which 
were excluded from the sample. For oil-exporting countries, we excluded Bahrain, Gabon, Iran, Kuwait, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), see Mankiw et al. (1992).
Table 3B (Cont.)
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Table 3C. Sub-components of EF
EF: 
Government 
Size (GOVSIZ)
EF: Legal structure 
and security of 
property rights 
(LEGAL)
EF: Access 
to sound 
money 
(SM)
EF: Freedom 
to trade 
internationally 
(TRADE)
EF: Regulation 
of credit, labor, 
and business 
(REGCRED)
Constant 0.4428 b 0.4522 a 0.5240 a 0.5097 a 1.1291 a
(0.1749) (0.1399) (0.1903) (0.1331) (0.2014)
Initial Income 
(log)
0.9801 a 0.9232 a 0.9119 a 0.9797 a 0.8032 a
(0.0237) (0.0187) (0.0206) (0.0189) (0.0214)
Population growth −0.0336 b −0.0570 a −0.0687 a −0.0111 −0.0459 a
(0.0134) (0.0181) (0.0144) (0.0092) (0.0139)
Investment ratio 0.0076 a 0.0074 a 0.0064 a 0.0036 c 0.0060 a
(0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0013)
Schooling 0.028 0.0361 c 0.0513 b 0.0714 a 0.1317 a
(0.0231) (0.0181) (0.0221) (0.0184) (0.027)
Real exchange rate 
undervaluation 
(UNDERVAL)
−0.0426 0.107 0.1664 c −0.4840 a −0.1257
(0.0593) (0.0311) (0.0957) (0.08) (0.1015)
Economic 
freedom (EF)
−0.0622 a 0.0412 a 0.0314 c −0.1013 a 0.0575 c
(0.0146) (0.0152) (0.0174) (0.0239) (0.0299)
UNDERVAL × EF 0.0153 c −0.0193 b −0.0175 0.1297 a 0.0469 b
(0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0162) (0.0174) (0.0216)
Marginal effects 
of UNDERVAL at 
minimum EF
−0.0283 0.0839 a - −0.2570 a −0 0.0093
(0.0516) (0.0217) (0.0515) (0.0512)
Marginal effects 
of UNDERVAL at 
mean EF
0.0462 b 0 0.0159 - 0.2590 a 0.1252 a
(0.0178) (0 0.0231) (0.0328) (0.0298)
Marginal effects 
of UNDERVAL at 
max EF
0.1100 a −0.0763 - 0.8116 a 0.2871 a
(0.0326) (0.0654) (0.1006) (0.0947)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(2) Test 
(p-value)
0.542 0.846 0.584 0.834 0.724
Hansen J-test 
(p-value)
0.116 0.101 0.203 0.469 0.245
Difference-in-
Hansen Test 
(p-value)
0.379 0.452 0.126 0.237 0.524
Number of 
Instruments
49 49 49 49 49
Country/
Observation
83/572 83/570 83/572 82/565 83/570
Note: See Table 2. a, b and c indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Finally, we further examine the contingency roles of each component of EF on the growth 
effects of real exchange rate undervaluation. The results are reported in Table 3C. First and 
foremost, all of the five specifications pass all of the tests making them well-specified. The 
results show that the interaction terms between UNDERVAL and the sound money index (SM) 
are not significant (column 3) while the interaction with LEGAL is negative and statistically 
significant (column 2). Further evaluation on the later finding at the three levels of LEGAL 
reveals that the marginal effect of UNDERVAL is positive and significant at the 1% level at 
the minimum level of LEGAL but disappear when LEGAL is improved towards the mean and 
maximum levels. Thus, the (aggregate) main results are robust in three out of five components 
of EF reflecting government size (GOVSIZ), column 1, freedom to trade internally (TRADE), 
column 4, and regulation of credit, labour, and business (REGCRED), column 5, since their 
interaction terms with each component of EF are positive and significant at the conventional 
levels. These show that the marginal growth effects of exchange rate undervaluation are 
enhanced along with the improvements in the quality of fiscal institutions, institutions that 
function to promote international trade, and regulatory institutions that promote productive 
private economic activities. These findings indeed extend further support to the ‘embedded’ 
institutional framework advocated by North (1990), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2003, 2005), 
Rodrik et al. (2004) and Rodrik (2008), among others, that the underlying institutional setting 
embedded in developing countries is fundamental not only directly to influence growth but also, 
and perhaps more importantly as we show here in this paper, to translating policy variables 
including exchange rate undervaluation into higher growth in developing countries that are 
usually embedded with weak institutions. 
CONCLUDING REMARK
The effects of the misalignment of currencies on growth are hotly debated with conflicting 
views: ‘the bad’ and ‘the good’ views for growth. Much empirical evidence points towards 
overvaluation hurting growth while undervaluation helps growth (Rodrik, 2008). While “the 
bad” view argues toward ‘getting policy right’, recent “the good” views argue that embedded 
institutional infrastructure plays a crucial role in making macroeconomic policy effective in 
promoting growth in the long-run (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Easterly, 
2005; Rodrik, 2008), i.e. ‘getting policy right’ should be complemented with ‘getting institutions 
right’ (see also Rodrik, 2006, p. 978; IMF, 2003, p. 107-108). This view relies on the statistical 
evidence that shows that policy variables (inflation, trade policies, and real exchange rate 
overvaluation) lose statistical power in explaining growth when institutions are also controlled 
for. However, the literature seems to be silent on whether the data supports institutions-policy 
complementarities (Slesman, 2014; Emara, 2012). In this study, we have provided new evidence 
to complement the literature on the complementarities (interaction) between institutions and 
the RER in influencing economic growth in the context of developing countries.  
Thus, this paper fills the gap by examining the contingency effect of economic freedom 
on the nexus of the exchange rate and economic growth in a relatively homogenous panel 
of 83 emerging markets and developing countries during the period 1976-2010. Based on 
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system GMM that controls for the endogeneity of exchange rate undervaluation, economic 
freedom as well as their interaction terms and all other control variables; and weakness and 
proliferation of instruments, the results reveal that the institutions-policy complementarities 
view is supported by the data for developing countries. Particularly, the marginal growth effects 
of exchange rate undervaluation are enhanced when there is an improvement in the level of 
economic freedom (quality of market-supporting institutions) from the lowest to the highest 
level. This finding sheds additional light on the importance of institutions in facilitating the 
growth effects of exchange rate policy. The policy implications that can be derived are that 
policymakers in developing countries should be pragmatic in seeking for institutional reforms 
to increase the level of economic freedom because such effort can increase growth dividends 
from exchange rate undervaluation policy. For example, the higher the level of economic 
freedom (through better protection of property rights, law enforcement and good quality of 
regulatory institutions) would provide an environment that promotes incentive structures for 
economic agents to undertake productive economic activities, such as accumulating physical 
and human capital and to pursue technologically upgrading innovation (North, 1990). Such 
an environment would consequently lower the transaction costs, minimise market failures and 
improve the profitability of the tradable sectors which in turn further boosts the effectiveness 
of real exchange rate undervaluation policy, hence accelerating growth in the long-run. Our 
results further suggest some key areas for reforms namely fiscal and regulatory institutions as 
well as institutional arrangements promoting trade. For instance, a lower tax rate system to 
promote private incentives for investment and productive effort, less burdensome regulatory 
arrangements on business, labour and credit and other institutional arrangements (e.g. a lower 
tariff system) that promote international commerce (see Justesen, 2008) would complement and 
enhance the growth benefit of an exchange rate undervaluation policy that seeks to relatively 
promote profitability in the tradable sectors in developing countries.
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